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The Florida tomato industry produces  about 90 per-  MODEL  SPECIFICATION
cent of the domestic  fresh tomato  supplies  during the
November to mid-June season (Brooker and Pearson).  Fresh  tomato  shippers  provide  shipping-point  and
Most of this  supply  is produced  in an  area  under the  wholesale  markets  with  32  distinct  tomato  qualities
authority of Federal Marketing Order 966 for fresh to-  during the Florida production season. Shippers sort to-
matoes.  Federal  marketing  orders  have  been  scruti-  matoes by grade,  size,  and maturity.  The four grades
nized in recent government  studies and the USDA has  shippers provide are 85 percent U.S.  number one,'  U.S.
been under pressure to justify the existence of these or-  Combination,  U.S.  number 2,  and U.S. number  3. The
ders (USDA, AMS).  Federal Marketing  Order 966 uses  five size groups are extra large,  large, medium,  small,
quality  restrictions  to  provide  orderly  market  condi-  and  extra small.  The extra-small  tomatoes  have been
tions for  producers  and consumers.  This study  mea-  restricted from the market since the 1977  season.  This
sures  the gains that producers  could realize with quality  restriction  is lifted only during periods of short supply
restrictions  and assesses  the process for implementing  and then only temporarily; for example,  the restriction
these restrictions.  was  lifted for short periods  after  freezes in  1977  and
Price discussed  the effect on revenue  of restricting  1980 destroyed part of the crop.  Because our sample
quantities of a product from the market.  His results in-  consisted  of weekly  data  in the  1980  and  1981  sea-
dicate  that an  optimum culling  rate  can be  defined if  sons, we considered only the four larger sizes shipped.
the elasticity of demand and the quality price response  The extra-small tomatoes were grouped with the small
are known. Defining the optimum culling rate with the  tomatoes  during the  short  period they  were  shipped.
Price procedure requires  that the product be differen-  Finally,  there  are  two  maturities,  mature  green  and
tiated on a continuum of quality measures.  Florida to-  vine-ripe,  resulting in 32 quality types from the com-
matoes,  like most  agricultural  products,  are  segregated  bination of four grades,  four sizes, and two maturities.
for marketing purposes  within defined size  and/or grade  At  any  particular  point in  time and  space,  market
guidelines,  giving  a specified  set of sizes and  grades  prices for different types of tomatoes  generally differ.
for the product.  These grades and sizes are established  Prices are ranked according to grade and size, with the
prior to each season. Culling from this set of sizes and  price of extra-large  tomatoes greater than the price of
grades requires  a specific  size  and/or grade to be ex-  large tomatoes.  The price of U.S.  number 1 tomatoes
eluded from the market,  therefore not allowing  a con-  is greater than the price of U.S. combination tomatoes.
tinuum of choices within a season.  The approach used  The general pattern of price-ranked order is rarely vi-
here to investigate the effects of quality restrictions on  olated.  There  is  no established  price pattern  with re-
producers  includes  (1) development  of  a  theoretical  spect to maturity.
model for testing the effects of a restriction on specific
sizes  and/or grades;  (2) estimation  of a structural  model  Growers Model
for Florida tomatoes  encompassing  the factors from the
theoretical model,  and (3)  measurement of the impacts  The grower's profit is the difference between gross
of restrictions on producers via simulation procedures.  revenues  and  total production costs.  A  marketing re-
The empirical  model developed and used here for sim-  striction has  no effect  on production costs.  A restric-
ulation purposes is similar to one proposed but not es-  tion  merely  prevents  the  grower  from  marketing  a
timated  by  Montes.  A  model  for prices  received  by  product  already produced.
growers  for fresh tomatoes  was  formulated  and  esti-  Before a restriction can be implemented,  it must be
mated  in order to measure  the impacts  of restrictions  concluded  by  the  committee  governing  the  Federal
on growers.  The impact of restrictions  on shippers  is  Marketing Order (Florida Tomato Committee) that the
then discussed and implications  are drawn concerning  restriction will benefit the industry.  The committee  is
the implementation of such restrictions.  nominated by the  growers  and appointed by the U.S.
John J. VanSickle  is an  Assistant Professor,  Department of Food and  Resource  Economics,  University of Florida. Guillermo  E.  Alvarado  is a former Graduate  Student  in the Department of
Food and Resource Economics,  University of Florida.
i When no more than  15 percent of tomatoes  in any lot fail  to meet the requirements  of U.S. number  I grade and no more  than one-third of this  15 percent (or 5 percent) are comprised of
defects causing  very serious damage,  including no more than  I percent that are soft or affected by  decay, such tomatoes may be shipped and designated as  at least 85  percent U.S. number I
grade.
109Secretary  of Agriculture.  The committee  normally  The  summation  of the  first  bracketed  terms in  (3)
consists of growers  and grower-shippers.  For growers,  equals  the marginal  revenue gains  (MRGi) from  a re-
a restriction  must be shown to increase revenues from  striction.  The  second bracketed  terms equal  the  mar-
the tomatoes  that continue to be sold. This increase in  ginal  revenue  losses  (MRL,)  from  a  restriction.  The
revenues  must be more than the loss in revenues from  grower  would  therefore  maximize  his  profits  where
the  tomatoes restricted.  The profit function for grow-  MRGi equals MRL,.
ers can be specified as  Because of the modus operandi  and legal and polit-
ical  considerations,  quality restrictions  are  selective and
32  stepwise.  The restrictions  are  selective  in  the sense that
1)  rG  =  (Pi-  PF  - Z) Qi  - CG  a specific  tomato  type  is  restricted.  The tomatoes  re-
i =  stricted are generally believed to be the tomatoes of the
lowest quality,  that is,  the smallest size or lowest grade.
where  The restrictions  are stepwise  in the sense that all or none
of a tomato type is eliminated.  With these types of re-
rG  =  profits to Florida growers for growing and  strictions,  the hypothesis  testing the benefits to grow-
marketing fresh tomatoes  ers of a specific set of restrictions  on tomato types  1
P,  =  the  gross  f.o.b.  shipping-point  price  re-  through r determines whether total revenue gains from
ceived per 30-pound box of tomatoes  sold  the  combination  of restrictions  exceed  total  revenue
by growers  for the i-th quality  type  (i= 1,  losses;  i.e.,
. . . 32),
PF  =  the fixed picking  fee charged  growers  per
30-pound box of tomatoes  sold,  O4P  OP  32
Z  =  fixed  packing  and  hauling  fee  charged  4)  f  . f 
growers per 30-pound box by the shippers,  r+1
Qi  =  total 30-pound boxes of tomato type i sold,  rp  aQ  Q  d
and  '  0 P ¥QL  dR,..  .dR,
CG  =  cost of growing tomatoes  to harvest.  Q. ..aQ\aR,  \Rr  Q
The picking fee does not increase with restrictions on
size because growers supervise  picking activities  and  r  - Q
instruct pickers to harvest only that fruit which is large  >  (P-PF  Z)  dR
enough to market.  A restriction imposed  by grade may,  i =  O  aR  _R
however,  cause  the  picking  fee  to  increase  because
growers  cannot  supervise  pickers  for  discriminating  where  quality  types  r  +  through  32 refer to  those grades as well as size.r  +  through  32 refer to  those grades  as well as size.  types  not restricted.  The left-hand side of expression
To  facilitate  understanding,  assume  that  a restric-  (4) represents  the total revenue  gains realized from re-
tion is a continuous variable with the effect of reducing  stricting tomato types 1 through r, while the right-hand
quantities of tomatoes marketed such that  side represents the total revenue losses.  To test the hy-
pothesis in expression  (4) we must, therefore,  first es-
2)  Qi  =  QP  - R...  ,32  timate a price function for each quality type of tomato,
i.e., estimate
where
(5)  Pj  f(QX)  j=1,...  ,32 QPi  =  30-pound boxes of tomato type i produced  f(Q
(i  1,...  ,32),  and  where Q is the vector for the quantities of tomato types
Ri  - 30-pound boxes of tomato type i produced  marketed and  X is the vector of exogenous  factors in-
but  restricted  from  the  market  (i  fluencing  the price of each tomato type.
1  . .. 32).  'Estimating  the price  functions  in expression  (5)
proved to be impractical. The data used for estimating
Substituting equation  (2) into (1) and assuming that  the  functions  were the  weekly  recorded  shipments  as
the  price of tomato type i depends  on the  quantity of  tabulated  by the Florida Tomato  Committee.  The
each tomato type marketed,  then growers would have  weekly data showed a high degree of multicollinearity
to satisfy the following first-order  conditions  to max-  in the  quantities of the  quality types.  Because  of this
imize profits with respect to a set of restrictions on to-  multicollinearity  problem, the procedure used was the
matoes and have the Hessian be negative definite.  procedure  proposed by Montes. The tomato  types were
32  divided into two quality types,  those considered for re-
3)  a-rG  [P  Qi  Qc  +  striction  and those not  considered.  Estimating  the price
R i j = 1  aQ.  R J  functions in this manner eliminated the multicollinear-
ity problem  and also reduced the number of equations
to be estimated.  Although some explanatory power for
specific  prices  is lost, the cumulative  affect of the re-
(P - PF  - Z)  _  0  i  =  1,.  .. ,32.  striction  on average  price can be measured.  The final
_  Ri  __  general model estimated was
110(6)  PNR  =  f(QnR, QR,  X)  11)  PNR,t  =  acO  +  o,  FQNR,,  +  a2 FQNR,t-2  +
where  PNR is the average value of nonrestricted  toma-  ot3FQR,,  +  04 FQR,t-2 +
toes,  a, (MQNR,t-I  +  MQR,t-I)  +
32  32  a 6 OQt- 2 +  OX7PNR,t-I  +  St
7)  PNR  (PiQ)  /  QP  where
i=r+l  i=r+l
PNR t  =  average f.o.b. price for a 30-pound car-
QNR is  the quantity of nonrestricted tomatoes  shipped,  ton  of  nonrestricted  tomatoes  in  time
period t,
32  FQNR.t  =  total shipments  of 30-pound  cartons  of
8)  QNR=  E  QPj,  nonrestricted  tomatoes in time period t,
i=r+l  FQR,,t  total shipments  of 30-pound  cartons  of
restricted tomatoes  in time period t,
and QR is the quantity of restricted tomatoes,  MQNR.t  =  total  crossings  of  30-pound cartons  of
Mexican  nonrestricted tomatoes  in time
r  period t,
9)  QR=  E  QP,.  MQRt  =  total  crossings  of  30-pound  cartons  of
i = 1  Mexican restricted tomatoes in time pe-
riod t,
Specifying  the  price function in the  form of equation  OQt  =  total shipments of tomatoes from all do-
(6) and noting that aQi / aRi equals  -1  simplifies the  mestic U.S.  sources  other than Florida
test of the hypothesis  in equation (4)  as  in time period t,
Et  =  random disturbance of the model.
QPR  P  The f.o.b. price  was hypothesized  to be  a function of
0  Nf  QNR dQR >  the shipments  from Florida in the  current week (time
O  aQR  period t) and two weeks prior (time period t-  2).  Both
QR  quantities were  considered  because  retailers can pur-
Jf  (PR  -PF  - Z) dQR  chase tomatoes  either directly  from Florida shippers,
O  in which  case current  shipments  effect retail  demand
and f.o.b.  prices,  or from terminal  markets,  in which
If expression  (10) is true, then restricting  QR tomatoes  case shipments  from two weeks prior effect retail  de-
from the market will be beneficial to the growers.  mand and f.o.b. prices.  A lag of two weeks  was con-
sidered  because  of  the  lag  associated  with  moving
Florida  shipments  to terminal  markets  (Brooker and
RESULTS  Pearson; Bohall).  Mexican quantities were lagged one
week because most Mexican production is of the vine-
Data  ripe maturity and  must be shipped through the market
channels  relatively  quickly  to  ensure  quality  (Men-
Data  used  for  analyzing  the  hypothesis  stated  in  doza).  The coefficients for restricted and nonrestricted
expression (10)  were collected  from the weekly  ship-  Mexican tomatoes were forced to be the same. Mexico
ment  reports  published  by the  Florida  Tomato Com-  shipped the restricted tomatoes for both restrictions for
mittee for the  1979-80 and 1980-81  seasons and from  only short periods of time, restricting their shipment to
discussions  with various representatives of the Florida  the U.S.  for all other periods.  Because of this limited
tomato industry.  information,  the summation  of Mexican  quantities  of
Two types  of restrictions  were considered  feasible  restricted  and  nonrestricted  tomatoes  was  considered
for  the  Florida  tomato  industry:  restricting  small  to-  one variable in the model estimations.
matoes (hereafter called a size restriction) and restrict-  The shipments from other domestic  sources  are for
ing U.S. number 3 tomatoes (hereafter called a grade  total  shipments  because  the  marketing  order  has  no
restriction).  The restrictions  were  tested by  first esti-  control  over  domestic  production  outside  the  desig-
mating  an f.o.b.  price  model for each restriction  and  nated  marketing  order  area.  These  shipments  were
then deducing the growers' price model by subtracting  lagged two time periods for two reasons. First, most of
the costs of picking (PF) and of packing and shipping  these  shipments  come  from California,  and  the  dis-
(Z).  tance  requires  additional  time for these shipments  to
impact the Florida market.  Second,  these  shipments are
F.O.B.  Price Model  mostly mature  green tomatoes,  which permits them to
move slower through  the market  channel  because
The general price model proposed for analyzing the  quality will  not deteriorate  as  fast as quality  in vine-
effects of restricting  tomatoes can be shown  as  ripe tomatoes.  Finally,  the price  of nonrestricted  to-
111matoes  in  the  previous  week  was  included  because  The size restriction  was the only quality restriction
Brooker and Pearson  concluded that buying  and  sell-  that was  shown to possibly benefit growers.  The aver-
ing brokers base their prices on many factors,  includ-  age direct- and cross-price flexibilities of the variables
ing the price received the previous week.  for the f.o.b. size restriction model are given in Table
The results of the model estimations are presented in
Table  1.  The models  were  estimated  using ordinary  ( aNR,  FNR,,
2  -PNR,t  F  NR t least squares regression analysis.  The Durbin-h statis-  2.2 The direct-price flexibility  FQRt  PNR,t 
tics indicate that no serial correlation  is present in either  is similar to that reported by Firch and Young (Nuck-
model.  The model  for size  restrictions  yields  results  ton, p.  161).  The direct-price  flexibility  and cross-price
consistent with a priori  expectations;  that is, the signs  flexibility  for lagged  nonrestricted  Florida shipments
of the coefficients for all quantity variables  were neg-  (FQNR,t-2)  indicate  that quantities  shipped  two weeks
ative.  The results for the grade restriction model were  prior have  slightly more  influence  than  current  ship-
not consistent with a priori  expectations.  The signs of  ments in determining  price.  The same relationship  holds
the coefficients  for both variables  related to restricted  for the  cross-price  flexibilities  of current  and  lagged
tomatoes  were  positive,  indicating  that  higher  ship-  restricted shipments (FQR,t  and FQR,t- 2). These results
ments of U.S.  number 3 tomatoes  would increase the  indicate  a need for implementing  a size  restriction as
average price for all other tomatoes.  Conversations  with  soon as possible,  since once a market glut occurs,  the
industry  personnel  indicated  that  U.S.  number 3 to-  effect on prices is greater in two weeks.  The results  also
matoes are considered  an inferior product and that these  show the flexibilities for both the nonrestricted and re-
low-grade  tomatoes  are  poor  substitutes  for  higher-  stricted  tomatoes  to be approximately  equal,  indicat-
quality  tomatoes.  The  results  support  these  industry  ing a rather easy substitution across sizes of tomatoes.
comments because of the positive and low significance
of the coefficients  for restricted tomatoes.  In fact,  the
positive  signs  suggest  that  higher prices  may  cause  Table 2.  Means Flexibilities  of the Size Restriction
more low grade tomatoes to be marketed,  indicating a  Price Models.
need for estimation of a simultaneous equation system
where  quantities marketed depend on prices received.  Variable  F.O.B.  Model  Grower  Model
This was done, yielding a good mapping of the supply 
function for low grade tomatoes,  but the signs or sig-  - 4 
nificance  of the coefficients  for restricted tomatoes  in  FQ,t-2  -0.1051  -0.1465
equation  (I1)  were unchanged.  It was concluded from  FQt  -0.0885  -0.1235
the  analysis  that  a grade restriction  would  benefit 
growers  in the short run.  2 
OQ t 2 -0.0411  -0.0573
(MQN  +  MQR, t-)  -0.0909  -0.1268
Table  1.  F.O.B.  Price  Models  for  Non-restricted
Tomatoes .a
Equations
Regression  Grade  Size  Growers'  Price Model
coefficient  Variable  restriction  restriction
a 0 Intercept  3.4983  5.5739  Since the size restriction  was concluded  to be the only
(2.20)  (3.66)  feasible restriction benefiting growers,  the picking fee
a  FQR,t  -0.2133  -0.0518  was assumed  constant.  The growers'  price model  would
(-  2.64)  (119)  then be the f.o.b. price model,  less the cost of picking
*2  FQ  NR t-2  -0.1183  -0.0695
NRt  (-1.27)  (-1.30)  and cost of packing and shipping.  The picking fee and
a3  FQR,t  05793  -0.8535  packing  and shipping fees were  assumed to be $2.50
(1.13)  (1.31)  per carton.  This fee  was  within the  range charged  to
04i-2  "0.5883  -1.0679  .Ji
4  FQR,  (1.16)  (-1.65)  growers for these services as reported by Brooke.
a5  0Q-2  -15.5983  -21.4417  Subtracting  the  picking fee  and  packing  and  ship-
(-1.20)  (-1.73)  ping fees from the f.o.b.  price model does not change
c 6 MQt,,  -0.1308  -0.1081
06  MQ  tl  (-0  .9808  (-1.748  the parameters  of the model; however,  it does change
a7  PFt  0.8179  0.7191  the direct-  and cross-price  flexibilities  because  of the
(11.60)  (8.78)  change in absolute prices. The flexibilities are listed in
F-a2  0.81  0.870  Table 2  for the  mean  values  of the  variables  and are
F-ratio  32.06  31.74
Durbin-h  0.62  -0.32  larger in absolute value than the flexibilities of the f.o.b.
Degrees  of  freedom  61  61  price model.  These results show why growers may be
more receptive  to a restriction than other parties in the
a The  parameter estimates are  listed above the t - values associated  with each  param-  Florida tomatoindutry. Thatis, the grower price will
eter.  lora tomato  ndustry  That  s, the grower prce w
increase more in relative value than the f.o.b.  price.
' The flexibilities  are reported  for the average  values  for the variables of interest  and cannot be used  to determine the effects on total revenue  of a restriction.  Point flexibilities  are  required
to  determine the effects  on  total revenues  of a restriction  and  point flexibilities will change  as the values for the variables  of interest change.
112Size  Restriction Simulation  have accrued during periods when growers actually in-
~. ~  ~.  . . ^curred  net losses  and would have  increased  growers'
The analysis of the condition in expression (10) was  cued net  losses  and would  have  increased  growers' The  analysis of  the condition in expression (10)  was  revenues  75.7 percent during the restriction  period in
done with  a simulation of the grower's  model.  A re-  revenues  75.  percent  during the  res the  1979-80  season  and  81.3  percent  during  the  re-
striction  was considered  to be implemented  when the  the 19 
average  f.o.b.  Florida price  for  any  week was  at  50
percent of parity  or lower.  The restriction was imple-
mented at this price level because it is considerably be-  CONCLUSIONS  AND  IMPLICATIONS
low  the cost  of production  for growers  (Brooke)  and
because  this  general  price  level  has  rarely  been ob-  It has  been concluded  that Florida tomato  growers
served  prior to  the  two  seasons  analyzed.  From  the  wouldnotbenefitfrom  arestriction ofU.S. number 3
1971-72  season through  the  1978-79  season,  the av-  tomatoes.  The analysis  indicated  that U.S.  number 3
erage  f.o.b.  weekly  Florida price  was  below  50 per-  tomatoes  were poor substitutes for other tomatoes  and
cent of parity  only 5.3 percent  of all recorded weeks.  that  a quality restriction  of these low-grade  tomatoes
In the  1979-80  and  1980-81  seasons  the average f.o.b.  would not improve growers  revenues  in the short run.
weekly Florida price was below  50 percent of parity 7  It was shown, however, that Florida tomato growers
(20.6 percent)  and  13  (37.1  percent)  weeks,  respec-  '  .'. (20.6 percent)  and  13  (37.1  percent)  weeks,  respec-  could benefit from a restriction  on the shipment of small
tively, of the  34 weeks within  each season. tively, of the 34 weeks within each  season.  tomatoes during periods of low prices.  A restriction of
The restrictions were implemented  in the simulation  tomatoes  was eled  wen prices wre at  small  tomatoes  was evaluated  when  prices  were  at 50
for the week prices were at 50 percent of parity or lower  percent of parity or lower,  a price considered  well be-
and not lifted until one week after the observed  prices  The results showed that grow- low cost of production.  The results showed that grow-
were  above 50 percent of parity. This implementation  ers  could  have  increased  revenues  during  these  low
procedure  assumes  that the Florida Tomato  Commit- procedure  assumes  that the Florida Tomato Commit-  price periods by 75.7 percent in the 1979-80 season and
tee can react immediately to current prices.  The lifting  .3 pceni  1  1 seaon 81.3 percent  in the  1980-81  season. procedure  permits  the  committee to  operate  with thet  Committee i Why doesn't the Florida Tomato Committee impose
restriction  until  the  committee is  assured prices  have  restrictive regulation on  smaltomatoes  during pe- a  restrictive  regulation on  small  tomatoes  during  pe- improved  enough  to  allow  shipping  small  tomatoes  . improved  enoutgh  to  fallngblow  shipping  small  tomatoes  riods of low prices,  as these results  suggest they  should
again without price falling below 50 percent of parity.  do to benefit growers? One reason is that the commit-
The revenue gains to the Florida growers  from a re-  tee  i  o  oed of growers and grower-shippers.  Be-
striction  were  measured  in the simulation  as equal  to  cse  ci  and shippig  hrges  re tde e t sue iw  - cause  packing and  shipping  charges  are published  prior the difference between simulated prices with and with-  to the season  and areonnt throughout the  season,
* *  * * *-  1 r  t  *  r  to the season  and are constant  throughout the  season,
out the restriction,  multiplied by the quantity  of non-  restriction will benefit  shippers only when  the ship-
restriction until  the  committee  is  assured prices haveon  n  per operates on the  increasing  portion  of his average- losses equaled  the loss  in sales revenues  from the  re- losses equaled the loss  in sales revenues  from the re-  cost curve and his average cost is greater than the fixed
stricted tomatoes.  The results  of the  simulation  indi-
packing  and  shipping fee he collects.  A restriction may, cate that Florida growers  could  increase  their net  ebeeficialtogrowersshippers.
revenues  considerably  by  imposing  a restriction  on  therefore, be beneficial to growers  and not to shippers. revenues  considerably  by  imposing  a  restriction  on  . '. This conflict of interest is  one  reason the Florida To-
small tomatoes when prices  are at 50 percent of parity  mat  Committee has  difficulty agreeing  on the  impo-
or lower.  The gains  which  could  have been  realized  ston of a  t  ction.
during the  1979-80 and  1980-81 seasons are shown in  A  i  of  the  Florida  tomato
Table  3.  The total  net gains  represent  a potential  in-  industry isthe  imingofrestrictions.  hasbeenshown industry is the timing of restrictions. It has been shown
crease  of  11.0  percent  for growers'  re  in  the  . s  that quantities shipped have as much or more influence
1979-80 season  and 33.2 percent in the  1980-81  sea-  on prices two weeks after shipment, indicating  a need
son.  More important,  however,  is that these gains could  formposing  a restriction  as soon  as possible. Impos- for imposing a  restriction as soon  as possible.  Impos-
ing a restrictive regulation,  however,  requires at least
30 days and often up to 90 days.  If the Florida Tomato
Table  3.  Simulated  Gains  from  Restricting  Small  Committee waits until prices are at 50 percent of parity
Tomatoes. or lower before  beginning  the process  of imposing  a
restriction,  the problem  can be  history  before  the re-
_  °Season  striction takes effect. Temporarily  removing a restric-
Item  1979-80  1980-81
________________________  tive regulation  requires  only  3 days.  The Florida
Nuber  andiLeno  1  Period  - 8  wee  1 Period  - 8  weeks  Tomato Committee  could  impose  a restriction  on small
Restrictive  Periods  1 Period - 7  weeks
$  Increase  in  Grower  tomatoes  and temporarily remove it until prices  are at
Revenues  $15,760,000  $51,284,000  levels low enough  to justify  it  being reimposed.  This
%  Increase  in  Grower  procedure would eliminate  the timing problem of the
Revenues  During  Restrictions  75.7  81.3
restriction.  First,  however,  support for the  restriction
%  Increase  in  Grower 
Revenues  for  Season  11.0  33.2  must be gained  from  the Florida Tomato  Committee,
and the  restriction must  subsequently  be approved  by
the U.S. Secretary  of Agriculture.
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